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Abstract. The article carries out an assessment of the “reunification of Crimea with Russia” from the point of view of contemporary 
international law and examines the arguments of Russian scholars who aim to justify the acts of Russia in Crimea. The article aims to 
identify the strategies that are employed in seeking to offer an interpretation of international legal norms that corresponds to the interests 
of the Russian Federation. The research shows that in the legal discourse a new definition is attached to a “people” as an entity entitled to 
secession and right to “remedial secession” becomes, in principle, absolute, i.e. the exercise of the right to “remedial secession” is 
justified not only on the grounds of an actual physical threat, but also on the grounds of vague ideological threats, or temporary political 
instability. Moreover, the scientific discourse on justifying the „reunification of Crimea with Russia“ relies heavily on historical 
arguments that suggest restoring “historical justice” and reuniting historically united nations, and aims at diminishing the sovereignty of 
Ukraine and redefining it in such a way that enhances the scope of Russian sovereignty, while minimizing the sovereignty of post-Soviet 
states. The research suggests that consequently the current Russian legal discourse has become a political instrument used for constructing 
concepts and meanings necessary for the realization of Russia’s geopolitical interests as Russian scholars tend to manipulate international 
legal concepts and combine legal and pseudo-legal reasoning and subsequently an alternative pseudo-legal reality is constructed. 
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Introduction 
The annexation of a part of the territory of Ukraine – the Crimean peninsula was unexpected and shocking 
incident to both the international and academic community. It is generally assessed as a grave breach of the 
fundamental principles of international law, such as the principle on the non-use of force, the principles of 
territorial integrity and inviolability of frontiers (Leonaitė & Žalimas, 2016). Since the World War II, these 
principles have been regarded as the basis of international stability and, in particular, of security in Europe that 
has suffered the most during the both world wars. Therefore, the annexation was widely identified as a major 
challenge to the contemporary system of international law, in particular, questioning the credibility of the 
European security system founded on the 1975 Helsinki Accord. 
The annexation of Crimea, as well as the subsequent and ongoing Russian armed invasion to the Donbas region 
of East Ukraine, provoked discussions not only on the effectiveness of the above-mentioned principles of 
international law, but also on such issues as the content of the principle of the self-determination of peoples, the 
1 This is the publication of the WISE project, commemorating the 70th anniversary WWII end, implemented with the support of 'Europe 
for Citizens Programme' of the EU. 
2 Prof. dr. D. Žalimas is a renowned expert of international law and a professor at Vilnius University Faculty of law, the president of the 
Constitutional Court of Lithuania. His research interests lie primarily in the field of public international law, diplomatic and consular law, 
law of international organizations, human rights law and international humanitarian law. Prof. D. Žalimas took part in numerous EU and 
other international research projects related to human rights, democratization and honoring the memory of victims of totalitarian crimes, 
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significantly contributed to the research of the international and constitutional legal basis for the restoration of Lithuania’s independence 
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legal meaning of referendums, the nature and extent of the duty of non-recognition, and the overall role of 
international law in the conflicts of interests of the major powers. 
 
As the legal assessment of the Russian acts against Ukraine seems to be not a particularly difficult task, it might 
seem also not so worth examining the arguments forwarded by the Russian officials and scholars in justification 
of the annexation of Crimea and subsequent acts in Ukraine. However, the publications by Russian legal scholars 
are important for identifying how the employed arguments develop the official position of the Russian 
Federation. Although these publications and statements justifying the so-called “reunification of Crimea with 
Russia” have already become the object of research (Leonaitė & Žalimas, 2016, p. 28-62), this article provides a 
good opportunity to take a look at them from a different angle. That is a historical angle related with the lessons 
of the World War II that was preceded and started by the annexations accomplished in the same manner as that 
of Crimea. 
 
Thus, the key aim of this article is to assess, against the historical background related to the World War II, the 
arguments and strategies employed by Russian scholars in the legal discourse in justifying the “the reunification 
of Crimea with Russia”. Firstly, the article provides the general assessment of the annexation of Crimea under 
contemporary international law. Further the speeches of Russian officials and the publications of Russian 
scholars, where the attempts have been made to prove the legality of the annexation of Crimea, are considered by 
applying the methods of systemic analysis and generalization. This analysis is followed by the identification of 
the arguments and strategies used by Russian legal scholars for constructing such evaluation of the annexation 
that is favourable to the Russian Federation. The analysis carried out in the article serves not only an informative 
function, but it also discloses the ways in which international law is manipulated by the Russian academia. By 
employing the methods of analogy and comparative analysis, the arguments presented by the Russian officials 
and scholars in favour of the annexation of Crimea are also placed against the background of the arguments 
announced by the Nazi leadership in justification of the aggressive acts of the Third Reich prior and during the 
World War II. 
 
This comparison will lead us to the answer, how much the legal discourse of Russian scholars may resemble to 
the arguments raised by the Nazis in justifying the aggressive policy of the Third Reich. It is the author’s 
conviction that, once we are able to see identity with the Nazis ideology and argumentation in support of their 
aggressions, we should be brave to acknowledge and state that openly. One could hardly learn any lessons from 
the World War II, if he is afraid to see the truth when facing the deeds and ideas that have already led to the 
catastrophic consequences. 
 
1. Assessment of the Actions in Crimea under Contemporary International Law 
 
It would be unnecessary to repeat in detail the legal assessment of the annexation of Crimea, which was formally 
accomplished in five days.3 There is a general consensus both among states and international lawyers that the 
actions of the Russian Federation constitute an illegal use of force and should be qualified as an aggression. 
According to the universally recognised definition of aggression, any forcible annexation of the territory of 
another state, armed incursion into the territory of another state, blockade of the ports or coasts of a state, the use 
                                                 
3 After at the end of February 2014 the Crimean peninsula was taken under control of the Russian armed forces (at the initial stage 
concealing their identity), the so-called “referendum” was held on 16 March 2014. On 17 March, the results of the “referendum” were 
announced; on the same day, the Russian president Putin signed the order on recognising the Republic of Crimea as a sovereign and 
independent state. On 18 March, the “international treaty” was signed between the Russian Federation and “the Republic of Crimea” “On 
the accession of the Republic of Crimea in the Russian Federation and on forming new constituent entities within the Russian 
Federation”; this treaty was submitted to the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation for the review of its constitutionality. On 19 
March, that is, actually within one night, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation passed the judgment declaring that the above-
mentioned “treaty” is in compliance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation. In such a way, for the first time in history, the 
Constitutional Court was employed as a tool for committing an international crime of aggression. On 20 March, the “treaty” was ratified 
by Russia. 
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of armed forces stationed in another state in contravention of the terms of the status of forces agreement, as well 
as the sending of armed groups, are all acts of aggression (General Assembly, 1974, Articles 3(a), (c), (e), (g)). 
 
Since the actions taken by Russia in Crimea provoked certain discussions on whether an act of aggression can be 
carried out without significant military confrontation, it should be pointed out that, as it is clear from Article 1 of 
the Definition of Aggression, the key fact in defining aggression is the conduct of military actions by a state 
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political independence of another state; in addition, considerable 
importance is placed on the consequences of such actions. It is obvious that the actions by the Black Sea Fleet 
and special forces of the Russian Federation (including the so-called “green men” who took over the actual 
control of the peninsula by occupying the most important objects and blocking the Ukrainian forces) were taken 
with the aim of preventing the Ukrainian government from exercising its sovereign powers in the Crimean 
peninsula, as well as with the aim of creating necessary conditions for a smooth scenario of the annexation of 
Crimea, i.e. these actions were aimed against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. In addition, it is 
important to mention that reference to “aggression” in various resolutions adopted at multilateral political forums 
should be regarded as a significant proof attesting to the view taken by the states (opinio juris) with regard to the 
concept of aggression as not necessarily involving the intense use of arms (European Parliament, 13-3-2014, § 1, 
11; European Parliament, 17-4-2014, § 3;  Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 9-4-2014, § 14; 
OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, 2015, § 16, 21). 
 
Consequently, the so-called “secession” of Crimea, which took place as a result of the threat and use of armed 
force (in the presence of the Russia-controlled illegal military and paramilitary forces who performed the actual 
takeover of the territory of Crimea, blocked the Ukrainian armed forces and ports, in the face of wide-scope 
military maneuvers of the Russian armed forces along the Ukrainian borders, as well as the constant declarations 
by the Russian political leadership of the preparedness to use force) and the incorporation of Crimea into Russia 
are illegal in terms of international law and cannot be interpreted as the case of realization of the right of peoples 
to self-determination. Against this background, the circumstance that the “referendum” did not comply with the 
minimum international standards that guarantee the free expression of will (The European Commission for 
Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), 21-3-2014)4 is only a subsidiary argument pointing to the 
illegality of the annexation. 
 
2. Actions in Crimea from the Viewpoint of the Russian Federation 
 
It should be noted that the scholarly discussion providing a legal assessment of the actions of Russia in Ukraine 
and examining the ensuing challenges to international law is dominated by the Western authors, whereas the 
number of publications by Russian legal scholars on these questions is rather limited. It is evident that the 
arguments provided by the latter scholars mainly develop the official position of the Russian Federation. In 
particular, the speech of Vladimir Putin of 18 March 2014 serves as an inspiration to these authors and guides 
them in developing their arguments. Therefore, the arguments used by Russian lawyers should be viewed as part 
of the lawfare strategy, which refers to exploiting legally unfounded arguments in order to weaken the positions 
of the opponent in the international arena, as well as to shape public opinion.5 As Christopher Borgen has noted, 
“using legalistic rhetoric can muddy the waters, even when the legal argument is doctrinally weak” (Borgen, 
2015, p. 277).  
 
In view of the above, it would be worthwhile to concentrate on certain strategies employed by Russian 
politicians and lawyers who try to justify the so-called “reunification” of Crimea with Russia. These strategies 
raise serious concerns, as they resemble or, sometimes, are even identical to those used in the period of the 
                                                 
4 In the Opinion the Venice Commission held that “circumstances in Crimea did not allow the holding of a referendum in line with 
European democratic standards”. Circumstances indicating disregard for democratic standards are similarly referred to in the report of the 
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights of 15 April 2014 on the human rights situation in Ukraine (Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, 15-4-2014, § 6). 
5 For more on this conception see, e.g., Tiefenbrun, 2011.  
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World War II by both aggressor countries, the Third Reich and the USSR, in order to justify their acts of 
aggression, including the annexations of foreign territories. 
 
2.1. The Concept of the “People of Crimea” and the Right to Self-determination 
 
As it is well known, the main narrative, exploited by Russian politicians and lawyers to deny the annexation of 
Crimea as an illegal acquisition of territory, is centered on the alleged self-determination of the “Crimean 
people”. At the core of the narrative is the alleged coup d’état carried out in Ukraine by right-wing radicals in 
February of 2014 (often referred by Russian officials as “the neo-Nazi coup”), which was followed by the 
purported collapse of the Ukrainian state; consequently, the “Crimean people”, fearing possible persecution, 
allegedly acquired the right to secede from Ukraine and join Russia. In connection with this narrative, several 
key points can be identified.  
 
Though the authors defending the “secession” of Crimea avoid disclosing the features of the “Crimean people” 
in greater detail, their position could be linked with the arguments about the “Russianness” of Crimeans. For 
example, Vladislav Tomsinov maintains that “the political and cultural autonomy of Crimea, consolidated in the 
Constitution of 6 May 1992 adopted by the Supreme Council of the Crimean Autonomous Republic, ensured the 
retention of its Russianness [emphasis added here and afterwards]. According to this author, this autonomy was a 
compromise, on the one hand, between Russia and Ukraine and, on the other, between Crimea and Ukraine. This 
compromise gave the Russian people the possibility for the full-fledged realisation of their right to self-
determination without seceding from Ukraine, i.e. within the Ukrainian state” (Tomsinov A., 2014, p. 26). In the 
open letter to the International Law Association, signed by prominent Russian lawyer Anatoly Kapustin on 
behalf of the Executive Board of the Russian Association of International Law, it is emphasised that ethnic 
Russians in Crimea are not a minority, since the Crimea historically was a part of Russia (Kapustin, 2014). Thus, 
although this discourse is formally about the multi-ethnic “people of Crimea”, emphasis is placed on the 
importance of the ethnic Russians. At the same time, attempts are made to deny their status as a national 
minority (a group holding no right to self-determination in the form of secession under the established Russian 
legal doctrine). 
 
Such arguments are very close to those employed by the Third Reich in constructing their claims concerning 
Germans in Czechoslovakia (Sudetenland), Poland (Danzig), and Lithuania (Klaipėda (Memel)), as well as in 
grounding the Nazis claims for Austria. All these claims originated from the concept of the alleged unity of the 
German-speaking nation and the German historical affiliation and rights to these territories. However, it is worth 
examining this argumentation in more detail. 
 
2.2. Claims for “Remedial Secession” 
In order to substantiate the claim for a “remedial secession”, two interrelated lines of argumentation are 
employed. The first line, which is dominant, centers around the alleged restrictions on the Crimean autonomy 
and the alleged exclusion of Crimeans from participation in political processes; the second one highlights the 
alleged violations of human rights and threats allegedly faced by “the people of Crimea”. 
 
As regards the purported restrictions of the autonomy of Crimea, A. Kapustin goes as far as to directly accuse 
Ukraine of having not created conditions for the secession of the Republic of Crimea. He points out that, as a 
result of the steps taken by the central government of Ukraine in order to preclude the secession of Crimea in 
1992, “the people of Crimea were clearly refused their right to external self-determination [emphasis added]” 
(Kapustin, 2015, p. 111). In this way, the borderline between internal and external self-determination is 
completely blurred. It is also suggested that the Crimean inhabitants were excluded from political representation. 
A. Kapustin claims that “an unconstitutional coup […] deprived the Crimean people of the right to 
representation in the central government of Ukraine” (Kapustin, 2015, p. 116). V. Tolstykh links the direct 
exclusion of the Crimean population from participation in political communication with the removal of Viktor 
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Yanukovych from the office of the President of Ukraine, also with the campaign directed against the Party of 
Regions and the Communist Party of Ukraine, as well as with an inadequately representative transitional 
Ukrainian government and the lustration process (Tolstykh, 2015, p. 135). Why this statement makes dependent 
the survival of “the Crimean people” on the existence of V.Yanukovych and his party regime or the communist 
party, one can hardly find the answer.  
 
The arguments aimed at showing the alleged consistent striving of the Crimean inhabitants towards self-
determination and underlining the concurrent denial of their possibilities of exercising this right are 
supplemented with statements about the threats allegedly posed to “the people of Crimea”. For example, the 
chairman of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation Valery Zorkin stated in his recently published 
book that the “actions on behalf of Russia […] was a necessary and inevitable response to blatantly illegal 
actions of the Kiev authorities that performed a coup, as well as to a direct military threat to security of the 
Russian population of Crimea by Islamic terrorists and Ukrainian neo-Nazis. Russia could not regard these 
threats as anything but military” (Zorkin, 2015, p. 264). Again, any additional comments are hardly needed. 
Except the fact that in his statement the chairman of the Russian constitutional court associates the indigenous 
population of Crimea – the Crimean tartars – with the “Islamic terrorism”. 
 
It is important to note that the perception of the alleged threat to the existence of “the people of Crimea” among 
Russian authors is not unanimous (it should not be a surprise as the abilities to create such a threat are different 
by different authors). Though some, like V. Zorkin and A. Kapustin, speak of physical threats, V. Tomsinov and 
V. Tolstykh concentrate on cultural aspects. For example, V. Tolstykh maintains that “the absence of human 
rights violations in Crimea similar to those that had taken place in Kosovo may not serve as a ground for 
refusing its population, which was excluded from political communication, the right to self-determination”  
(Tolstykh, 2014, § 8). According to this author, such events in Ukraine as the initiative for the repeal of the law 
on regional languages, numerous cases of the demolition of monuments to Lenin (which are claimed to be rather 
national than political symbols), anti-Russian proclamations, as well as forced spreading of ideas of European 
integration and European identity can be viewed as an attempt to impose cultural requirements, which can be 
overcome only at the expense of the loss of the identity of a nation  (Tolstykh, 2014, § 9). In the opinion of this 
author, “a massive scale and systematic character of these events and support or approval from the new 
government heightened the threat posed by these measures and have justified the secession of Crimea to a 
significant extent”; the same author comes to the conclusion that “the imposition of cultural requirements can be 
qualified as genocide, though not in the narrow sense as defined by the Convention on Genocide […], but in the 
broad sense as defined by Lemkin” (Tolstykh, 2014, § 9).6 Again, additional comments about the legal value of 
these highly primitive and political statements are hardly needed (e.g., why the identity of the Crimean people or 
Russians in Crimea should be necessarily linked with Lenin, but not with the European values). 
 
Consideration should be also given to the striking similarity between the above-mentioned arguments with those 
employed by Adolf Hitler with respect to Germans in Sudetenland: “All I can say to these representatives of 
democracy is that this does not leave us cold, no, if these tortured creatures can find neither justice nor help by 
themselves, then they will receive both from us. [...] I am simply demanding that the oppression of three and a 
half million Germans in Czechoslovakia cease and that the inalienable right to self-determination take its place” 
(Hitler, 1938). 
 
2.3. The Role of the Referendum 
                                                 
6 Authors’ note: Raphael Lemkin, the author of the term “genocide”, understood genocide not just in terms of the mass killing of 
individuals belonging to a certain national group, but also as “a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential 
foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves. The objectives of such a plan would be 
disintegration of the political and social institutions, of culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the economic existence of 
national groups, and the destruction of the personal security, liberty, health, dignity, and even the lives of the individuals belonging to 
such groups. Genocide is directed against the national group as an entity, and the actions involved are directed against individuals, not in 
their individual capacity, but as members of the national group” (Lemkin, 2005, p. 79). 
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Another feature that becomes evident in the publications of the Russian authors justifying the “secession” of 
Crimea and its incorporation into Russia is the placement of an emphasis on the importance of a referendum, by 
attributing international legal significance to the institute whose origin lies within national law and which 
remains regulated at the level of national law.  
 
A particularly radical position on the importance of referendum is put forward by V. Tomsinov, who contends 
that “in terms of the contemporary Western European legal tradition, founded on the principle of government by 
the people, the principal legal ground for the reunification of Crimea with Russia [emphasis added] was the 16 
March 2014 referendum, which showed the genuine striving of the overwhelming majority of Crimean people to 
join Russia” (Tomsinov, Pravo 2014 (11), p. 28). Thus, this author regards the referendum as an independent 
and, in principle, unconditional ground for the secession of Crimea. Nevertheless, from the perspective of 
international law, the most original position, making “the will of a people” absolute, was expressed in the open 
letter of the Russian Association of International Law, where it was held that the “destiny of the Crimea was 
decided by the expression of the will of the Crimean people and the people of its historical homeland – Russia. 
[…] Mass meetings in all big cities of Russia in support of reunion with Crimea after twenty three years of a 
break are a peculiar will expression of the multimillion people of Russia concerning its historical rights for 
Crimea” (Kapustin, 2014). Probably this statement also would not require any additional comments, if it was not 
written by the authoritative academic institution in a manner very similar to that had been used by the Nazi 
criminals at the Nuremberg Tribunal while attempting to justify the annexation of Austria in 1938 (one can recall 
also that the Austrian Anschluss was accomplished by means of “a referendum” after the country fall into the 
factual control of Germany). 
 
In this respect, the conclusion set out as early as in the judgment of 1 October 1946 by the International Military 
Tribunal at Nuremberg regarding the Austrian Anschluss is worth quoting: “It was contended before the 
Tribunal that the annexation of Austria was justified by the strong desire expressed in many quarters for the 
union of Austria and Germany; that there were many matters in common between the two peoples that made this 
union desirable; and that in the result the object was achieved without bloodshed. These matters, even if true, are 
really immaterial, for the facts plainly prove that the methods employed to achieve the object were those of an 
aggressor. The ultimate factor was the armed might of Germany ready to be used if any resistance was 
encountered” (International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), 1 October 1946, p. 31 (427)). Thus, already the 
Nuremberg Tribunal has demonstrated the real value of the arguments about the decisive role of referendums in 
pursuing annexations of foreign territories. 
 
In the same vein, the purported assent to the act of aggression was exploited to justify the actions of the Third 
Reich against Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Belgium, and Luxembourg; the same method was also used by the 
USSR in order to carry out the occupation and annexation of the Baltic States (Žalimas, 2015, p. 351-353). 
 
2.4. The Role of the Russian Armed Forces 
Another aspect that is important for unfolding the narrative constructed by the Russian authors on “the 
reunification of Crimea with Russia” is the interpretation of the role of the Russian armed forces in Crimea. It is 
worth noting that the Russian international legal doctrine, as well as the position submitted to the International 
Court of Justice in the case on Kosovo, was formerly consistent in underlining the provision, deriving from the 
Declaration on Principles of International Law, that the right to self-determination must be exercised “through 
the free choice by the people concerned, without outside interference” (Written Statement of the Russian 
Federation, 2009, § 80). The main strategy that is currently adopted in order to circumvent this norm is the 
assertion that the aim of the Russian armed forces was not to influence the expression of free will, but to create 
conditions for expressing this will, i.e. to help “the people of Crimea” to realise self-determination. As Georgy 
Velyaminov notes, “there has not been a single reliable fact established about any kind of pressure or, the more 
so, pressure imposed by the force of arms on the people who came to the referendum” (Veljaminov, 2014). 
According to V. Tomsinov, the Russian forces were called upon “to protect the people of Crimea against the 
forcible actions by the Ukrainian authorities or radical nationalists depriving the citizens of the possibility of 
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holding the referendum” (Tomsinov, Zakonodatelstvo, 2014 (7), p. 19). One can ironically note what could be 
the reaction to the argument that in 1938 in Austria the Nazi armed forces also pursued the aim to secure the 
plebiscite on unification with Germany. 
 
A notably unconventional interpretation of the role of Russia in Crimea is developed by V. Tolstykh. Along with 
the assertions that the participation of Russia was not aimed at interfering with the process of the formation of 
the will of Crimeans and that, thus, the actions of Russia, which prevented the Kiev government from 
intervening in the course of events, cannot be viewed as coercion against the inhabitants of Crimea, V. Tolstykh 
indicates that “the main circumstance justifying the participation of Russia in the process of Crimean self-
determination is the breakup of the statehood of Ukraine”  (Tolstykh, 2015, § 11). Invoking the ideas of Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, this author argues that, due to the coup that took place in Ukraine, the Ukrainian state broke 
up; as a result, the social contract was broken and the inhabitants of Crimea were transferred to the state of 
nature. For this reason, “the configuration of international relations changed: instead of Russian-Ukrainian 
relations, relations between Crimea and new Ukraine, between Crimea and Russia, and between Russia and new 
Ukraine have emerged. The actions of Russia, which prevented the extension of the jurisdiction of the new 
Ukraine to the territory of Crimea, were lawful, since they were based on the consent of the population of 
Crimea. These actions cannot be qualified as support for one of the sides in a civil war, as, from the moment of 
the breakup, Crimea and the new Ukraine ceased to be parts of one state. In these circumstances, the additional 
arguments provided by Russia (invitation by the President, right to self-defense, humanitarian intervention) are 
unnecessary” (Tolstykh, 2015, § 11). Indeed, it is difficult to find more absurd interpretation of international law 
that has nothing in common with the well-established concept of continuity of states, according to which a state, 
as the subject of international law, cannot disappear and cannot be released from its obligations due to the 
change (even of unconstitutional nature) of its government (as well as the state continuity is presumed in case of 
changes in its territory or population and in case of foreign military occupation)  (Marek, 1954, p. 15-126, 551-
587;  Crawford, 1979, p. 403-420). In this regard, one can also recall the fact that in September of 1939 the 
Soviet Union invaded Poland (joining the Nazi Germany in war against Poland) providing the justification that 
the Polish state had allegedly ceased to exist (Marek, 1954, p. 148-149). 
 
This kind of argumentation, as provided by V. Tolstykh, does not only obviously transcend the “boundaries” of 
international law. Regretfully it should be noted that it is not a case of an isolated occurrence. Rather absurd or 
legally irrelevant arguments are similarly set out in the publications of other Russian scholars of international 
law. 
 
2.5. Historic Arguments to Justify the Russian Actions in Crimea 
The above-described argumentation by the Russian authors (on the role of the referendum and the Russian armed 
forces), for the most part reflecting the related statements of politicians, is apparently intended to reinforce the 
narrative on self-determination. The same purpose is pursued by raising the next group of more sophisticated 
arguments, namely, those of historical nature about the alleged historical rights of Russia to the territory of 
Crimea. 
 
Here the key role is played by the arguments concerning the restoration of “historical justice”; they include the 
statements on the unconstitutionality of the transfer of Crimea to the Ukrainian SSR in 1954, as well as the 
statements highlighting the historical belonging of Crimea to Russia. Namely, the historical argument was 
dominant in the “Crimean speech” by Putin of 18 March 2014; it was also used by Vitaly Churkin, Russian 
Ambassador to the UN, in his address of 27 March 2014 to the UN General Assembly: “Historical justice has 
triumphed. For ages Crimea has been an integral part of our country, we share history, culture and, the main 
thing, people. And only the voluntarist decision by the USSR leaders in 1954, which transferred Crimea and 
Sevastopol to the Ukrainian Republic, although within one state, has distorted this natural state of affairs” 
(Churkin, 2014). One can recall that in the same manner the Third Reich grounded the claim to return of the 
territories taken from Germany in accordance with the 1919 Versailles Peace Treaty. 
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It is worth noting how the “historic argument” is presented by the chairman of the International Law Association 
A. Kapustin: “[historical justification] cannot be ignored when it comes to reuniting historically united nations. 
The division of Russia and Crimea was largely artificial and in the process of the disintegration of the USSR a 
satisfactory legal settlement of territorial issues was, for historical reasons, not implemented. Subsequently, the 
conclusion of bilateral agreements between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, as well as documents of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States stated only the status quo and did not address the question of the legal 
status of some of the disputed territories, which means that there are still some unresolved territorial disputes and 
conflicts on the territory of Commonwealth of Independent States” (Kapustin, 2015, p. 113). In the open letter of 
the Russian Association of International Law, it is also pointed out that, as a result of “holding the Crimean 
referendum, the expression of will in favour of the return of the Crimean people to the historical homeland – 
Russia became the restoration of historical justice, realization of historically developed legal grounds” 
(Kapustin, 2014). 
 
In such a way, as noted by Borgen, shared history is presented as a factor that as if somehow lessens the 
sovereign rights of Ukraine over its territory, thus bringing back the times of pre-UN Charter norms  (Borgen, 
2015, p. 255). Indeed, the quoted statements are nothing more than complete ignorance and cynical denial of 
such well-established principles of modern international law as the respect to territorial integrity of states and 
inviolability of their borders as well as of the principle uti possidetis juris applicable in delimitation of borders of 
the newly emerged states. These statements also represent “truly innovative” approach to the border delimitation 
treaties making them simply meaningless. 
 
At the same time, the works of some Russian international legal specialists include an even more ambitious 
application of historical argumentation. Alexander Salenko argues that the Belavezha Accords  (Soglashenija o 
sozdanii Sodruzhestva nezavisimyh gosudarstv [the Agreement establishing the Commonwealth of Independent 
States], 8 December 1991)7 concerning the termination of the existence of the USSR violated the will of the 
people of Russia on the preservation of the USSR in the form of a renewed federation, as was expressed in the 
Soviet Union Referendum of 17 March 1991  (Salenko, 2015, p. 158-159). Furthermore, the same author states 
that the USSR president Mikhail Gorbachev and other participants of the Novo-Ogaryovo meetings, who, on 23 
April 1991, signed a treaty between the central leadership of the USSR and nine union republics (this treaty had 
to turn the Soviet Union into a federation of independent states), consciously violated the fundamental 
constitutional norms of the USSR, since the results of the Soviet Union referendum of 17 March 1991 were 
obligatory to all union republics, including those six (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Georgia, Armenia, and 
Moldova) that had boycotted the referendum (Salenko, 2015, 156). 
 
It is obvious that arguments aimed at assessing the legality of the disintegration of the USSR have a potentially 
much broader area of application than the justification of the annexation of Crimea. In fact, A. Salenko argues 
that the USSR president Mikhail Gorbachev illegally recognised the independence of “the self-proclaimed Baltic 
republics” (Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia), as none of these three republics fulfilled any requirement of the 
USSR Law “Concerning an order of the solution of the questions with regard to an exit of the union republic 
from the USSR” of 3 April 1990 (Salenko, 2015, p. 156-157). One can ironically note that in such a manner A. 
Salenko is preparing the ideological basis for the attempts to restore all the Soviet empire. Again, it is 
regrettable, but in his statements one can hardly find any legal arguments, moreover, any basis in international 
law. 
 
2.6. Putting the Sovereignty of Ukraine in Question 
Besides historical revanchism, the ideas aimed at the questioning of the status of Ukraine as a sovereign state 
play an important role in the argumentation of the Russian authors justifying the annexation of Crimea. The 
                                                 
7 The Belavezha Accords is an agreement signed by the RSFSR President Boris Yeltsin, the Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk, and 
the Belarusian Parliament Chairman Stanislav Shushkevich. The agreement declared that “the USSR, as a subject of international law and 
a geopolitical reality, is ceasing its existence” and established the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in its place.  
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questioning of the Ukrainian statehood is based on the arguments pointing to the unconstitutionality of the 
alleged coup (the Revolution of Dignity), as well as to the influence allegedly exerted by the Western powers on 
the new Ukrainian government. According to V. Tomsinov, one of the features determining the specificity of the 
Crimean secession is that “the reunification of Crimea with Russia took place largely as a result of the perception 
by the people of Crimea that periodic state coups, […] the inability of the changing governments to ensure 
smooth economic development and the essential conditions of normal human life are not accidental: they 
indicate not temporary ailments of Ukrainian society and of its political and legal consciousness, but its 
permanent vices precluding the emergence of normal self-reliant Ukrainian statehood. The inability of Ukrainian 
society to create a fully-fledged state capable of ensuring the essential conditions of normal human life to all its 
citizens […] provides one more reason for the secession of Crimea from Ukraine and its reunification with 
Russia” (Tomsinov, Pravo 2014 (11), p. 30).  
 
The attempts to humiliate the Ukrainian state by denying its sovereignty are also obvious when the situation in 
Ukraine after the annexation of Crimea is described. As the holding of the elections in Ukraine in October 2014 
removed the possibility of relying on the argument about the unconstitutionality of the government, this line of 
argumentation has shifted towards views highlighting the alleged subordinate status of Ukraine. Such a view is 
presented in rather extreme terms, for example, in the monograph by V. Tomsinov: 
 
“The reluctance by the leaderships of the USA and the European Union, as well as by the Ukrainian ruling 
groups, which are completely dependent on the USA and the EU, to solve the question of the belonging of 
Crimea by way of negotiations […] leaves the only actually possible means of solving this controversy, i.e. the 
total disintegration of the existing Ukrainian state and its liquidation as an international legal entity [emphasis 
added by V. Tomsinov]. Such a possibility of releasing the relationship of Russia with the Western states from 
the burden of the Crimean problem is completely implementable in practice, mainly as a result of increasing 
destructive processes within the Ukrainian state. These processes have an objective character and cannot be 
stopped by means of any external forces.  
 
As a result, Ukraine has definitely become subordinate to the governing Western groups, primarily those of the 
USA, and, in principle, has lost even that small degree of independence of its state that it had been granted after 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Decisions primarily important and essential to the Ukrainian state are being 
made not in Ukraine. The Ukrainian authorities, including the President and the Head of the Government, are 
mere agents of a foreign will, executives of decisions made by the leaderships of the USA and the European 
Union.  
 
A particular weakness of the current Ukrainian state renders its ruling layer […] absolutely ineffective in 
fulfilling its role as the agent of the Western policy […]. Namely this circumstance does not allow the West to 
prevent the ultimate demise of the Ukrainian state” (Tomsinov, 2015, p. 118-119). 
 
At this point, it is useful once again to refer to the insights expressed by Ch. Borgen, namely, that sovereignty in 
the Russian rhetoric “becomes ephemeral” and is shifted from being the core value, protected by international 
law, to simply a fact that may or may not come into play in particular circumstances. At the same time, 
sovereignty itself becomes redefined in such a way that enhances the scope of Russian sovereignty, while 
minimizing the sovereignty of post-Soviet states (“Near Abroad”)  (Borgen, 2015, p. 261-262, 273). Meanwhile, 
all the nations who have chosen independence from the Russian domination are depicted as no more independent 
and deserving to disappear from the world map. One could hardly add something to this absurd concept that has 
no roots in law. 
 
Conclusions 
 
What one can learn from the above-described argumentation of the Russian authors justifying the annexation of 
Crimea? Perhaps the main conclusion would be that this argumentation demonstrates us once more the 
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specificity of the Russian perception of international law which is different from that predominant in the West 
(Mälksoo, 2015, p. 192). This specific meaning of international law as a means of the Russian policy reflects the 
idea that the Russian state as a strong derzhava is entitled to a regional-historical “greater space”; Russia 
allegedly pursues a unique “Russian idea” and therefore also has the right to watch and guard its neighborhood 
(Mälksoo, 2015, p. 192). Apparently, according to this kind of perception of international law, such states as 
Ukraine can only exist provided they are subordinate to Russia and Russia is entitled to claim any territory that 
was a part of the former USSR. 
 
The analysis of how the international legal concepts are manipulated in the construction of the “reunification” 
narrative also proves us that there are no limits to these manipulations aiming to create an alternative pseudo-
legal reality that would serve for the justification of the so-called reunification of Crimea with Russia. All means 
are considered suitable in order to achieve this purpose: the boundaries between international and national law as 
well as between law and politics in general may be blurred, the apparently absurd arguments as well as the 
humiliating statements towards the whole neighboring nation and statements resembling hate speech may be 
used. As noted by Ch. Borgen, “Russia is building a revisionist conception of international law to serve its 
foreign policy needs”  ( Borgen, 2015, p. 279). Thus, it is regrettable, but one has to come to the conclusion that 
the current Russian science of international law has become a political instrument, i.e. it can be hardly perceived 
as a science at all. It rather continues the sad tradition of the former Soviet legal science – the servility towards 
the ruling regime. 
 
In concluding, it is also necessary to emphasise that all the elements of the “reunification” narrative perfectly fit 
within the broader political concept of “the Russian World” (Russkyj Mir), designed in order to justify actions in 
the so-called “Near Abroad”. The “Russian World” is not ethnic, but it encompasses the Soviet legacy and the 
Russian-speaking world. One of the key elements of this concept is Russia’s entitlement to protect groups 
belonging to the “Russian World” in countries beyond Russia’s own borders. Such entitlement is extended on 
the subjects abroad, listed by V. Putin: “compatriots [sootechestvenniki], Russian people [russkiie lyudi], and 
people of other ethnicities, who feel that they are a part of the broad Russian World” (Socor, 2014). Given the 
fact that the protection may involve the entire range of available means, ranging from political and economic to 
military, this conception serves as an important tool for the Russian geopolitical ambitions. As described by 
Marlene Laruelle, “the concept of the Russian World offers a particularly powerful repertoire: it is a geopolitical 
imagination, a fuzzy mental atlas on which different regions of the world and their different links to Russia can 
be articulated in a fluid way. This blurriness is structural to the concept, and allows it to be reinterpreted within 
multiple contexts. First, it serves as a justification for what Russia considers to be its right to oversee the 
evolution of its neighbors, and, when it considers necessary, for an interventionist policy. Secondly, its reasoning 
is for Russia to reconnect with its pre-Soviet and Soviet past through reconciliation with Russian diasporas 
abroad. Lastly, it is a critical instrument for Russia to brand itself on the international scene and to advance its 
own voice in the world” (Laruelle, 2015, p. 1). 
 
It is important to draw attention to the apparent similarity of the essence of this doctrine, including the 
“reunification” narrative constructed by Russian lawyers, with the following statements: “1. We demand the 
union of all Germans in a Great Germany on the basis of the principle of self-determination of all peoples. 2. We 
demand that the German people have rights equal to those of other nations; and that the Peace Treaties of 
Versailles and St. Germain shall be abrogated.” (Programme of the National Socialist German Workers’ Party, 
2008) Yes, it is true, that these statements are the first two points from the Program of the National Socialist 
German Workers’ Party, the organisation that was declared criminal by the Nuremberg Tribunal. Therefore, it is 
not a surprise that the Russian “reunification” narrative is so close to the Nazi ideology and actually employs the 
arguments identical to those presented by the Nazi criminals during the Nuremberg proceedings. 
 
Finally, it is the conviction of the author of this article that the lessons from the World War II have not been 
learned adequately if such concepts as that of “the Russian World”, including the analysed “reunification” 
narrative, are still alive. They cannot be learned so long as we avoid naming the things in their true names. Let 
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me finish this article with the ironic rhetorical question: has Russia actually won the war against Nazism or has it 
finally lost it. 
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